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BRETT ALAN SANDERS: Pledging Allegiance [Arte Retórica #1]

Publish On 09-16-2006 , 7:42 AM

...there are in cities men who hate the people (demos), and if ever the lot falls to them they will destroy the people (demos). But the people itself ought to keep watch and elect all those who are well-disposed towards itself, and ought to choose as its army-commanders those who are suitable for the job, and to choose others to serve as guardians of the law, and so on.

—anonymous Greek sophist, author of the Dissoi Logoi

In the wake of 9/11/2001, the Indiana legislature passed a bill requiring that public schools re-institute a time-honored practice that many of us remember from our youth: of standing every morning, saluting the flag, and pledging allegiance both to it "and to the Republic for which it stands." Starting with the 2005-06 school year, the day has begun with the principal's or his representative's directing of the pledge, and immediately following that a carefully non-denominational "moment of silence." This is a conservative community, where student-initiated Christian prayers are still the norm at commencement exercises every spring. No one, as far as I know, has voiced the slightest concern about this new State-sanctioned practice; nor has any student, so far as I am aware, hesitated (at least on the basis of any contrary principle of conscience) to stand with reverence while the generality of that body perform the ritual devotion.

Among faculty, in the first days of the Fall 2005 term, I only heard expressions of gladness and praise for the practice, praise tinged with a hope (however faint) that it might go some way to restoring traditional discipline—reminding the less grounded of this present generation of public-school students that some things are sacred. And far be it from me to disagree with the nobler intentions behind such legislative initiatives. Indeed, what harm can this one do? What could be more sensible and innocuous than for a people to continually remind itself, through its most cherished institutions of State, Church, and School, of their common and uniting allegiances? Certainly there is a good deal to be said for the practice. As President Lincoln put it: "United we stand, divided we fall."

Yet, "on the other hand..." (as good Tevye so often deliberates in Fiddler on the Roof). And the fact is, as anyone caught between two or more versions of Truth comes to know, there are many "other hands"—potentially, at least, as many as minds to conceive and fight for them. No one has appreciated this fact more than the ancient and oft-maligned Greek sophists, whose most democratic art of rhetoric has been reduced in our Western heritage to such unfortunate pejoratives as "sophistry" and "mere rhetoric," dismissed, by the demagoguery of much that passes in the United States today for public discourse, as self-indulgent and even treasonous speech.

Hence my unease with this latest flurry of public declarations of an ambiguously interpreted patriotism. To whose vision of flag and republic are we pledging ourselves? Likewise, when we cover ourselves with yellow ribbons and constant protestations of support for our troops, to whose definition of "support" are we publicly understood to commit ourselves? In a July 21, 2003 comment in neighboring Evansville’s Courier & Press, I supported our troops by worrying about the several young women from Perry Central High who were financing their future educations by becoming "traveling soldiers," as the Dixie Chicks might have put it, and by worrying about what message my young students were getting from the popular rush at the time to pillory those Southern songsters for daring (despite that pointedly troop-friendly song) to question our President's latest war. Yet to at least one outraged reader, my version of support was insipid and unpatriotic, a grave insult to the courage and moral fiber of those young soldiers of both sexes who were willing to sacrifice all, if necessary, for the freedoms I thoughtlessly enjoyed.

The point is not whether I or the Dixie Chicks are right about the inadvisability of the ongoing Iraq phase in the President’s potentially unending war against the enemies of freedom, but the irony of so many efforts to shout us down—to create a climate (in the name of a universal struggle against the enemies of democracy) in which one does not feel safe in exercising the democratic responsibility of a reasoned public discourse and dissent within our own borders. The same people who condemn the totalitarian instincts of a radical Left, which on our college campuses have not always been above shouting down the most reasonably-considered opposition to their own Utopian visions, now egregiously commit the same sin from the halls of their own power and influence. In any case, sexist or thoughtless sentimentalist that I may be, I knew enough when one of those girls came back from Iraq for a period of recuperation, after having been burned in an ambush that killed a number of her fellow soldiers (men and women), to just embrace and wish God's blessings on her, never mind what her own opinions about Bush's war might be. The fact that I denounce the war doesn't mean that I denounce her, or that I fail to admire the courage and faith that by all accounts have distinguished her service as a Marine.

Our quintessential American Henry David Thoreau, in his essay "On the Duty of Civil Disobedience," argues from the moral high ground of his Transcendentalist faith against another American President's war of aggression against Mexico, and he preferred jail to paying his tax in support of that campaign. All Polk’s rhetoric about self-determination aside, it doesn't follow that his war was just, that it wasn't motivated by chiefly un-humanitarian aims. We might still argue with some of Thoreau’s most basic and principled assertions, such as the one (grounded in a frontier ethic of unencumbered individualism) suggesting that the government that serves us best will govern us least—or not at all. The reality that we seem to have inherited, ushered in by those who claim to reduce government’s strangle-hold on our economic lives, is one in which the interests of extreme wealth are most truly unbridled while the unfortunate masses of lesser humanity are subjugated to the operations of a neoliberal global economy that has neither heart nor conscience. This new reality may be touted as an expression of Thoreau's and Emerson's own principle of self-reliance and individual initiative, but clearly the domestic profiteering post-Katrina is not the reality that either of those men contemplated.

But I digress. As Louis Menand points out in The Metaphysical Club (2001), the violence of civil war led us from Emersonian and abolitionist moral absolutes to the more contingent truths of the American Pragmatists—whose practical philosophy of what can be agreed upon (and thus made workable) in a given time and place was not so different from the democratic discourse of the early sophists. The pragmatic rhetorics of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and John Dewey were almost totally eclipsed, Menand suggests, by the second half of the twentieth century, certainly by the time of the impassioned but often unreasoned rebellions of the '60s. Even Martin Luther King, Jr.'s finely reasoned and essentially pragmatic Civil Rights Movement was based in a conception of absolute and inalienable moral principles which, despite the clarity of Thomas Jefferson's liberationist rhetoric, are never self-evident but must ever be argued. Remember that Jefferson himself was an owner of slaves, as were the great democrats of ancient Athens. If such truths as the inalienable rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"—of both white and black men (and women)—are so clearly evident, how to explain that they have so seldom been recognized in the long course of world history? And how to explain that, at this juncture in our own nation's relatively short history, we are once more compelled to argue for the separation of powers—the checks and balances—of our supremely pragmatic Constitution, protections which our present Administration seems so intent on dismantling?

Let me be clear about one thing: I have no quarrel with the ideals of Martin Luther King's or any comparable movement of non-violent and reasoned resistence to oppression. I do not begrudge the Black Church its moral authority, summoned from an expansive interpretation of Biblical scripture and from the suffering of the African American community itself. I even sympathize with the armed rebellion of Marcos's Zapatista rebels in Mexico's southern state of Chiapas—that revolution which after the brief and largely bloodless skirmishes of its first day, whether by design or by blessed circumstance, quickly became a war of Internet-sped comuniqués and treatises, at once poetic and rational, which spoke so loudly to the national and international communities as to seriously hamper the government’s massive push for the Zapatistas' extermination. What I do argue, in this age of increasingly dangerous and conflicting moral absolutes, backed up by competing threats of apocalyptic destruction, is that the moral imperatives of humanity’s shared responsibility for the least of these our brothers and sisters—regardless of color, creed, or nationality—can and must be argued (first and foremost) pragmatically. As Menand suggests—in paraphrase (as I recall) of the sentiments of Jane Addams, who was so influential in the thought of John Dewey—there are no benefits to be gained in human society that are not mutual: we are never truly protecting our own interests while suppressing the rights and privileges of others. This includes the rights of Palestinian rabbles—and present or potential terrorists—to land and water and dignity. As Barry Lopez suggests recently in a perspicacious environmental essay for the journal Granta, we are foolish to swallow the simplistic argument of the pro-war crowd that our enemies are solely motivated by an innate racial or religious hatred of Western democracy.

None of which is to suggest that those who have argued a more hawkish point of view have never had a leg to stand on—or that such arguments should have been dismissed out of hand. Unquestionably we inhabit a very dangerous world; in the immediate wake of 9/11, it was hard to know how to respond: to not respond at all was certainly unimaginable. But in the oppressive political climate that has followed, the politics of fear that the present Administration cynically enflames at every election cycle, it becomes ever more difficult to enter into substantive discussion of what a strong and informed reaction might be. In the simplified rhetoric of Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld, our only choice is the false dichotomy of perpetual pre-emptive warfare or the cowardly cut-and-run. The result of such an impoverished view of the rhetorical possibilities is that the countless other modes of action are never fully vetted, infinite "other hands" that might have yielded a more enlightened and effective course. Instead, in almost the same breath as his long-delayed admission that Iraq had nothing at all to do with 9/11 (as if he had never claimed it did!), our Great and Unilateral Decider asks us to believe that the conflict in Iraq is essential in the struggle against Al-Qaeda. If it has become so, he disingenuously fails to mention, it is surely at least in part because of the great folly of our decision to invade in the first place. Meanwhile, it is a fait accompli, and the only honorable choice to stay the course: to suggest otherwise, in this view, is the height of disloyalty or even treason.

On the other hand, as suggested by a chapter heading in Carl Sagan’s The Demon-Haunted World (1995): “Real Patriots Ask Questions.” To that effect Sagan quotes U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson (1950): “It is not the function of our government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the government from falling into error.” Any one of us can be wrong: as the American Pragmatists teach us, ideas are social constructs; the best ones can only be arrived at by a free interchange of rational and informed discourse. Impassioned discourse is not out of place, so long as it makes room for reason and a free exchange of information. Let's agree to leave aside, for the sake of argument, the details of whatever absolute Truths we may think to be privy to: the undeniable human fact is that there is not presently the remotest possibility of universal agreement on such points; to deny, with Platonic assurance, that the only Truth worth considering is absolute, unarguable, eternal, is to assure our continued demise and ultimate destruction. We must engage, if we are to avoid that fate, in the sophistic (and pragmatic, moral, life-enhancing) practice of dissoi logoi, the informed and open discussion of opposing arguments—lest the better ones be passed over or completely frozen out of consideration.

In the sophists' day, they were much ridiculed by Socrates and Plato in particular, and to a lesser extent by Aristotle, for going about teaching the arts of public discourse (not to mention "wisdom and moral excellence") to the common rung of people—and for their showmanship (not to mention the audacity of taking money for their itinerant services). Even Isocrates, their student and the best-preserved expositor of their basic philosophy, criticized what he took for the flippancy of many practitioners' technique, preferring a more settled and rigorous gathering of evidence, but in any case both he and they did much to destabilize (as suggested by Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, in The Rhetorical Tradition, 2nd Edition, 2001) "the unquestioned authority of arguments based on essential qualities"—essential not in the sense of necessary, but of perfectly stable and unerring in substance and nature: beyond dispute.

Socrates and his champion Plato, if you believe I. F. Stone's very persuasive account in The Trial of Socrates (1988), were the most arrogant of aristocrats and anti-democrats, indeed corrupters of youth against the free working out of the legitimate and operational people's State. If you question Stone's account, consider that of Cicero, whose own courageous rhetoric against the encroaching tyranny of the Caesars' Rome was sealed with his blood. Socrates, he writes, robbed the sophists of their proper designation as philosophers, separating "the science of wise thinking from that of elegant speaking, though in reality they are closely linked together." (Rhetoric, as Dr. Thomas M. Rivers of the University of Southern Indiana states in his classes, is at heart a philosophical method.) The fact that Socrates' discourses were "immortally enshrined in the compositions of Plato," Cicero adds, "Socrates himself not having left a single scrap of writing," led to "the undoubtedly absurd and unprofitable and reprehensible severance between the tongue and the brain, leading to our having one set of professors to teach us to think and another to teach us to speak."

"Yet it is important to understand," Dr. Rivers writes in his essay "Antidosis: An Apology for the Art of Rhetoric," that while Plato seems to have prevailed in the long-run of Western history, the sophists were the clear winners in their day. To them, rhetoric was not just a means of conveying a pre-determined metaphysical truth but "a mode of inquiry," a method by which "our communities come to agree on the beliefs and values that we would have within a culture." The crucial problem that American discourse faces today, at a time of increasingly uncompromising challenges from abroad, is that "[i]n a sense, a vast number of American citizens are Platonists, whether they have ever read Plato or not. For too many Americans, language is mostly about communicating truths that are a matter of demonstration, not about shared inquiry and the complexity of persuasion."

Perhaps, when all is said and done, it will be shown that I was wrong to doubt this Administration and its warmongering. In trying to convince you otherwise, I have in this essay even resorted to the occasional "rhetorical flourish," the heavy-handedness (for instance) of the word "warmongering," and the sarcastic "Great and Unilateral Decider." You who read this should certainly be wary of anyone whose argument relies only (or even primarily) on such tactics, though otherwise they are appropriate tools in the good rhetor’s arsenal, as the likes of Cicero and Isocrates (and even Plato!) can scarcely deny. Examine the rhetoric of the warmongerers, though, and ask yourself if their rhetoric ever completely rises above the level of name-calling, political smears, and artless dodges and deceptions. Eric Alterman, in the September 18, 2006 issue of The Nation, gives a pertinent example in the continued trashing (by the likes of Ann Coulter and Robert Novak) of deceased political-journalistic and "sophistic" firebrand I. F. Stone as a "paid Soviet agent"—an accusation so thoroughly discredited that their continued insistence on it suggests that they are either lying or shamefully (and inexcusably) ill-informed.

Alterman sums it up in this way: "It may be true, as Stone said, that 'all governments lie,' but democracy cannot function if journalists do too. This is why the success of liars like Novak and Coulter at the center of our political culture is a greater danger to America than a truck full of terrorists bent on doing us harm." And this is why I do not believe that I’m wrong in preferring the sometimes tedious, drawn-out, frustrating workings of rhetoric and diplomacy to the knee-jerk patriotism of an unbending military solution, ambiguously pledged allegiances, and the uncritical art of wrapping political dogma in the red-white-and-blue. In the face of lingering chaos in both Iraq and Afghanistan, of the increasing intractibility of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, of looming nuclear conflicts with Iran and North Korea, of increasing international frustration with our policies, our flair for unilateralism and the double standard, I think I might be excused for doubting that the choice of force and more force is ever going to yield the illusory carrot of security that this Administration so cynically holds out to the American demos.

[Brett Alan Sanders]



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BRETT ALAN SANDERS: The writer as a link of a chain: An Interview with Sebastián R. Bekes [Arte Retórica #2]

Publish On 10-30-2006 , 2:44 PM

When publisher Rosa Martha Villarreal invited me to contribute to "Tertullian's Blog," one of my first thoughts was that it would be nice to post an interview with my friend Sebastián R. Bekes, whose story "Un hombre, una máquina" ("A Man, A Typewriter") was forthcoming—in my translation—in the now-current issue of Tertulia Magazine. I vaguely envisioned a creative interaction among translated text, author, translator, and reader. Later, as my idea for a column focusing on the rhetorical arts began to take shape, it occurred to me that an interview with Sebastián would fit nicely into that larger scheme. The conversation may not take place in actual time, but I still hope that readers will feel free to enter it at any time, addressing comments and / or questions to Sebastián or me via my Tertulia email: bsanders@tertuliamagazine.com.
Sebastián was born on the Argentine border with Uruguay in the city of Concordia, province of Entre Ríos, in 1973. He studied Translation in English at the UNLP (National University of La Plata) in La Plata, and in August 1999 he obtained an academic-exchange scholarship at a college in Minnesota. He has published fiction in local journals, the Barcelona Review, and online at New Works Review. Two of his stories appeared in Antología Poesía y Narrativa Actual 2003, Vol. 3, published by Editorial Nuevo Ser; another appeared online, in 2004, in Editorial Bellvigraf's "Concurso Hispanoamericano Almafuerte" (http://www.bellvigraf.com.ar/). His Spanish-language translation of my novella A Bride Called Freedom, which is based on an obscure episode of Argentine history, was published in 2003 in a bilingual edition by Ediciones Nuevo Espacio (www.editorial-ene.com). Bekes continues to reside in his home town, where I had the distinct pleasure, in June 2005, of enjoying his and his family's gracious hospitality during my brief visit to that city
What follows is the text of my October 2006 interview with Sebastián, which was conducted via email (and wholly in English) between our respective homes in Tell City (Indiana) and Concordia.
BAS: Can you tell me something of your upbringing and education in Concordia? What role has family played in your intellectual and artistic formation? Who or what are some of your influences? When did you first know that you wanted to write? To do literary translation? To teach?
SRB: I am the youngest of five children (four males and one female). I was born and raised in Concordia. I did primary and secondary school there and then, at eighteen, I went to study at La Plata, in the province of Buenos Aires. I had started studying English when I was eight, so it was somewhat natural that I ended up studying English at University. I entered the Translation course of study. I love doing literary translation, but I have worked on other branches of translation too, such as the technical one.
I guess my family has influenced me in my artistic vein, though not as an imposition but subtly. One of my brothers is also a writer (poetry and essays, mainly) and a translator, and another is an excellent painter. My father was an engineer, and an omnivorous reader. My mother reads a lot too. Movies have also been a big influence on me. We watch lots of movies, and we discuss them. I also read a lot in my childhood, adventure books chiefly, and I started toying with writing in my adolescence. I went on with it in La Plata, but what definitely determined me was my trip to the U.S., through an academic scholarship. That is, it was not just the trip, but in the distance from home—both physically and emotionally—I began to realize what I could do with my writing.
Many authors have influenced me one way or another, but I think I may say that Faulkner, Hemingway, Cortázar, Conrad, Kafka and Borges have all left something in me. That is just to mention the better known, but as I said, many others have also given me food for imagery, themes, and style. The list would be long and perhaps rather tiresome. Even my neighbors and townspeople, unknowingly, give me words and ideas for my stories. Of course I am well aware that I have a long way to go yet.
As for teaching, well, it is not my "true call," as it were, but it came to me in a time that I needed to work, and it has been with me since then. It is not really a very satisfying or encouraging task these days, but it has its good moments.
BAS: Your childhood and adolescence encompass, roughly, the period of your country's so-called "dirty war" in the late '70s and early '80s, while since then you have lived the experience of an outwardly more democratic and transparent government—yet also of increasing political and economic collapse. At the same time, you studied for some time in the United States. What can you say about the similarities and the divergences between your country's experience and what you have observed of life in my country? What can you say about the condition and promise of Argentina after the crisis of the beginning of this new millennium?
SRB: I think these two countries are quite different in character, lifestyle and worldview. Most people in Argentina struggle daily to make ends meet, while in the U.S. this is not so much the case. In the U.S. people, more or less, have their daily and immediate life in order. That is, for the same amount of work and effort, you can make a living in the U.S., while that is not usually the case in Argentina. The collapse you refer to came from that terrible time in the '70s, almost as a natural effect. Fortunately, the country is now looking up and ahead, though little by little and not without labor pains and efforts. We're still struggling, definitely.
However, maybe due to the level of daily comforts and security that people take for granted in the U.S., I believe people in my country—generally speaking, of course—are more open-minded and alert to changes and possible deceptions. My feeling is that we have a more critical attitude, both towards ourselves and our own country and government. People in your country seem to be more submissive, and less critical of what they see and hear. But as I said, I think this is due to our different experiences and historical moments.
BAS: I came to you, it must have been, in early 2003, when I was looking for a Spanish-language translator for my historical-literary novella A Bride Called Freedom. The poet and writer María Rosa Lojo, of Buenos Aires, recommended you as someone well-versed in both the art of translation and the history and idioms of the nineteenth century. How did you come to those areas of expertise? And what pertinence does your country's earlier history have for its and the larger international community's present historical predicament?
SRB: First of all, I am no "expert" in those areas. I have just read enough and studied enough authors and texts from that time. But, of course, not enough to call myself an expert. I just have some knowledge and the rest is enthusiasm. Part of the conservative clan that ruled the country at that time still have a strong influence in the country's political decisions, though they have "updated" themselves to the current times. But don't take my word for it; it is just an individual and partial opinion.
BAS: The North American literary critic and writer Kenneth Burke argued that "effective literature could be nothing else but rhetoric"—that it is, in fact, a kind of persuasive discourse and "symbolic action." I am wondering, in that respect, how rhetorical you intend for your stories to be. Is there an underlying element of persuasion in your work? Does "rhetorical" to you equate, in any sense, with social consciousness or political judgment?
SRB: I don't think I can fully answer these questions. In any case, I can say that I tend to add some social (or political, if you will) views and observations to my stories, though they are not necessarily all mine. Probably the notion behind it all is to leave the readers thinking or questioning their own beliefs, even if it helps to confirm those beliefs. I don't know whether I always achieve that.
BAS: I ask that last question because of a thread of ironic social observation or commentary that seems to run through your stories. Of the two I have so far translated, "A Man, A Typewriter" and "Holes," both inhabit a rather barren urban landscape and are inhabited by protagonists who are severely challenged by the vicissitudes of contemporary life. In "Holes," published in 2005 in New Works Review, you play off of a passage from a Cortázar story, an existentialist motif of fragmented reality: in your story, the protagonist thinks he has found - at Laferèrre Station, at the part of the track where at precisely 3:22 the train meets the platform—the "joyous hole" that will lead him beyond the torment of his workaday existence. In other stories, themes of alienation and suicide are also prominent. In what way does this reflect your rhetorical intention and perspective on human experience in general and in Argentina in particular?
SRB: I do believe this current trend of life is altogether alienating, and more so here in Argentina, where life is all but stable. There's a truly thin line that separates sanity from madness, and there are times when we all cross that line. The thing is to try not to go too far away and get lost, and be able to "come back" as soon as possible, and then, hopefully, laugh about it and be able to talk, or write, about it. Laughter is really a fine remedy to our daily lives. What would we do without it?
BAS: I am particularly fond of “A Man, A Typewriter,” which I have found rich on so many levels. On one level, it offers a gritty realism, a glimpse of the world from the perspective of the losers in the present global economy, but a realism leavened with Cervantine humor and an absence of resentment. On another, perhaps the most simple (and even naive), it is a sweet and optimistic parable of the writing process itself, though ultimately rendered improbable by the meteoric rise of the protagonist's fortunes. Which leads to the third level that I have detected: the dreamscape, though it is almost story's end before the reader stops dreaming himself...or supposes that he has been dreaming. Can you talk about the place you were at, what you were thinking about, when you wrote this story? Would you add or subtract anything from my analysis?
SRB: What initially inspired this story was the story of how R. Chandler began to write and get published. He was unemployed at the age of 45, he read a magazine, and started writing detective stories for that magazine. Of course, I added some bits and tips of my own. I especially like the final idea, that of the writer—the artist—being a mere link of a larger and unknown chain of life, which he helps to build.
BAS: Three years ago you were publishing a little journal of stories, essays, poems, and translations called Iletrados, which in English might be rendered "The Illiterates" or "The Unlettered." Its content, ranging from sophisticated meditations on the state of education to Spanish-language renderings of Shakespearean sonnets and the prose of Virginia Woolf, was anything but unlettered. Are you still involved with this project? And would you mind talking about your particular objects—and the struggles involved in putting it together? What else are you working on at the moment?
SRB: I am not doing this journal anymore, mainly due to lack of time. The idea was to offer my townspeople something different to read apart from the local news and what new make-up or what thin, tiny clothes the top models are wearing. I did not succeed, of course. The main difficulty was that I had to do almost everything, except the actual printing. I was director, editor, ad man, producer, proofreader, etc. And the rewards and joy and excitement were eventually little compared to the effort involved. I do not regret the experience at all. On the contrary.
Currently, I am conducting a run-down literary workshop which for that reason will probably be closed soon. On a more positive note, I am in contact with a Welsh agency with the aim of translating Welsh authors to Spanish - and getting them published, of course. Finding an interested publisher is the chief problem. Apart from this, I keep teaching English and am about to finish my studies to become a Language and Literature (Spanish) teacher.


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BRETT ALAN SANDERS: Not Just Another Polemic Against the Iraq War [Arte Retórica #3]

Publish On 02-12-2007 , 4:30 PM

No sooner had the dust begun to settle from last November’s Congressional elections than I was at work conjuring "Arte Retórica" number three. It would be a sequel to número uno, in which I’d argued in favor of the ancient Greek sophists’ practice of dissoi logoi, or “opposing arguments.” In doing so I had pled, on the contentious subject of the war in Iraq, for a more ample consideration of all the “other hands” that the Bush administration still seemed intent on suppressing (here a humble bow and sholom aleichem – "peace be with you!" – in the direction of Tevye, that tragi-comic weigher of arguments of Fiddler on the Roof). As for this contemplated follow-up, I felt it my rhetorical obligation – and thus my civic! my patriotic! duty – to carry it through, lest otherwise the precariously ascendant Democrats cave to the hawks in both major Parties and vote (against increasing popular sentiment) for the war’s further escalation and prolongation.
        
But wait a minute. I don’t want this to be just another polemic against our Great Decider’s mad rush toward Armageddon, do I? And besides – however impressive a case I might make against this President’s determination (shrouded as it is by inspiring euphemism) to order a surge rather than an orderly reduction in U.S. troop levels – I did not, in proposing a column on the rhetorical arts, intend to elevate myself to the status of political pundit, just one more Platonic layer-down of pious certainties.
   
No, I intended instead to focus on the rhetorical arts themselves, on the continued relevance of the ancient philosophy of rhetoric as a means, not merely of persuasion or propaganda, but of shared inquiry in the interest of reaching the best possible agreements on matters of mutual concern and controversy. For as Professor Rivers argues in his essay in the present issue of Tertulia, the truth of any issue of public contention is neither known nor knowable except by process of rigorous investigation and argument.
 
My immediate intention of writing was delayed, in any case, by the convergence of some of these very misgivings and (aside from an inescapable mountain of pressing responsibility) a persistent bout of personal illness and weariness that is still in process of being resolved. Even these most immediate contingencies of physical health and well-being present such intricate webs of our unknowing! Wisdom requires, from time to time, that we just stop in our tracks and listen.
 
* * *
 
So my less partisan self reproves me. And now it’s only by chance – as I surrender to the prosaic and immediate task of soothing the bluster and disappointment of a three-year-old grandbaby who’d rather (at this moment) I were his grandma – that I experience something of an epiphany about how innate the unfortunately maligned rhetorical arts really are in human beings. For this moment I seem to touch the very mystery of that core reality.
 
Nicholas is the only child of Anita’s and my youngest daughter. He is the apple of his grandparents’ eyes, and loves to spend time with both of us, but there’s no question that to his mind this house (built around 1940 by my own grandfather) is Nana’s, first, and Poppy’s only by her indulgence. On this occasion (his mom has just called from her cell phone, announcing their pending arrival at curbside) he is in the first place not feeling all that well, and to compound matters has just learned of Nana’s unexpectedly filling in for another waitress at the cafe where she works. So as I approach the curb, I can see that the news has already set him to crying. I open the right rear door and disengage his screaming self from the car seat. I pick him up, and amidst assurances to my daughter that the two of us will be fine, I walk him on up the stairs to Nana’s house – leaving Mommy to hurry off to her evening class at the local community college.
 
For Nicholas and me, school is in session too. His role as my reluctant pupil (and accidental teacher) is to fully acquaint me with the depths of his despair. I think I manage to get his sock cap and coat off first, but otherwise as soon as feet hit floor he is off and running the length of the couch, around the the end of it into the living room proper where it faces. Once there he plops himself, face down like teenage girl on bed, onto the blue throw rug on the diagonal between TV and fireplace. All this while he hasn’t stopped crying. He scarcely pauses even now, just for an instant after realizing that I’ve left the room. Glancing up furtively to see where I’ve gone, then seeing me catch him in the act, he throws himself back into the performance with the contentment of misery in the presence of a captive audience.
 
What follows, on my part, is a brief exercise in futility. Would you like to see what’s on TV? Spongebob, maybe? Jimmy Neutron? No! How about a drink of apple juice or milk? A bit of a snack? No! Can I read you a book? Rock you in the wooden rocker that I bought Nana for Christmas the year you were born? No! My memory of the occasion may not be exact, but it is surely accurate to within at least a small margin of error. I still make some sympathetic noises to him, anyway, rub his back, let him know that I understand his disappointment but that otherwise there’s not much I can do. Another waitress’s child is in the hospital and Nana has had to go work for her. But Nana will see him later, and meanwhile I’ll just sit down here in my recliner, have a look at my mail (which includes, I think, a new issue of my favorite "progressive" magazine The Nation) while he takes whatever time he needs to process his sorrow.
 
And the sorrow is real enough; he’s not just performing. Before long he has worked himself into a frenzy of heaving and sputtering and coughing that goes well beyond acting, and by now it’s clear that he can’t get it under control without my determined intervention. I see at once the urgent necessity of abandoning the laissez-faire strategy that I have first employed and, rather than foolishly staying that mistaken course, performing a swift about-face in the light of new understanding. My goal remains unaltered: to teach him to begin owning and working through (as independently and honestly as a three-year-old can) the roller-coaster of mood and emotion that he will ever afterwards wrestle with. Only the means to that end have had to change, as they often do. And so grabbing him just now in this latest jag of unceasing, erratic flight about the room, I clutch him to me and begin to rock as he’d thought he didn’t want me to earlier; and almost at once he has let his face nestle in against my shoulder.
 
So we have begun to rock. And soon, I hope, to the degree possible with such a newcomer to the rhetorical arts, to reason. In order to do so I must first of all know my audience, as in this case I fairly well do. If only, the irrepressible polemicist in me ponders, the original cadre of neocons and rabid militarists who had our President’s ear post-9/11 had thought it worth their time to know theirs!
 
The great Roman orator Cicero, writing about mid way in the first century B.C.E., addresses (in the context of the advocate in a courtroom) the desireableness of encountering in his audience "some mental emotion that is in harmony with what the advocate’s interest will suggest. For, as the saying goes, it is easier to spur the willing horse than to start the lazy one."
 
In approaching his audiences, then, Cicero claims to "scent out with all possible keenness their thoughts, judgments, anticipations, and wishes, and the direction in which they seem likely to be led away most easily by eloquence. If they surrender to me, and [...] of their own accord lean towards and are prone to take the course in which I am urging them on, I accept their bounty and set sail for that quarter which promises something of a breeze." If the audience is hostile or (what is worse) indifferent, the task is harder but not impossible. For "so potent is that Eloquence, rightly styled, by an excellent poet, ‘soulbending sovereign of all things,’ that she can not only support the sinking and bend the upstanding, but, like a good and brave commander, can even make prisoner a resisting antagonist."
 
Nicholas is only nominally hostile to the eloquence with which I would seek to soothe him, and by no means indifferent. So it is a simple enough matter, once the brunt of his emotional storm is spent, to sound the right tone and set our sails to where the breeze most fairly blows.
 
And this is where I am graced with my epiphany. I am experiencing this relationship between me and my grandbaby (between my "I" and his "Thou," as Jewish existentialist philosopher Martin Buber might have put it) as something almost tangible, in which each ceases to be wholly "Other" and is subsumed in the being of his rhetorical or dialogical partner. For me, who am alone of the two profoundly conscious of what is happening, this has become a richly sacred moment. The child has tugged at the man, compelling him to face him as an equal and vital partner in dialogue; and by responding to this call in like manner, enfolding him in compassionate and listening presence, the man brings him home into the beloved grandmother’s maternal peace.
 
Am I wrong to suppose that this experience is at core the very basis of any healing rhetorical arts? And so I begin more fully to dialogue with him, and he with me. The dialogue goes something like this, with my voice now and then echoing the wisdom of public television’s Mister Rogers whose gentle rhetoric I learned to appreciate as I watched my own children enrapt in it:
 
I know. It’s rough when you’re expecting to see your Nana and she’s not there.
 
Yeah. (Sob, sob, sob.)
 
Poor Nicholas. And on top of that you’re not feeling well.
 
Yeah. (Heave, heave.)
 
It’s okay to cry when you’re sad. Then when you’re done crying, you’ll feel better.
 
Yeah, I know. (Sputter. Heave. Sob.)
 
Yeah. It’s okay to be sad. We’re all sad sometimes, but then when we’re done hurting we feel better. And Poppy’s here to comfort you and help you feel better.
 
Yeah. (Heave. Sob.)
 
You know your Nana and Poppy love you, right?
 
Yeah. I love you too. (Sniffle. Cough. Wipes snotty nose on my shoulder.)
 
And Nana will see you later. If not tonight, she’ll see you tomorrow.
 
Yeah. (Raises head, a sudden note of excitement in his voice.) Nana’s at work now, but she’ll come home and then she’ll play with me! Yeah! (Sniffle. Cough. Head nestles back onto same shoulder.)
 
Yeah. Poor little guy. It’s disappointing not to see your Nana when you’ve looked forward to it so much. But rest, now. You’ll feel better when you’re rested.
 
Yeah. (Weary. Hovering between wakefulness and sleep.)
 
And thus the most common of rhetorical episodes plays out. Communion has been achieved and child is comforted. Poppy is overcome with a rush of gratitude for the unforeseen circumstance which has led to his being privileged with such inexpressible sweetness.
 
* * *
 
In the face of such intimacy, I feel certain only of knowing precious little for sure about the deepest human mysteries (like Socrates, perhaps, though without the aristocratic boast that I. F. Stone attributes to him). This is another of the insights that my more polemical self can’t help but wish that people like George W. Bush – awash as they seem in smug certainties and unyielding partisan determinations – would get a whiff of.
 
As for the present debate on our Iraq policy, while I am personally persuaded by the evidence against escalation and in favor of withdrawal, humility compels me to acknowledge that the future obtainable through either course of action is hardly self-evident. I do remain troubled by the havoc which we have set loose from the pre-existent Pandora’s box of seething Middle Eastern tensions. I feel oppressed by the weight of responsibility for re-construction that our President and his counselors brought upon us with the essentially indiscriminate destructiveness (let’s be honest about this!) of their campaign of "Shock and Awe." But whatever reason and intuition I do have whispers that we might better meet that responsibility by a total reversal of a disastrously misguided course, by (starting with the act of withdrawal itself) full engagement with enemies both real and perceived – and, perhaps most urgently in the first place, with traditional allies who have tried to caution us against such dark pride as we have collectively allowed our President to display on our behalf.

In any case, while such are my convictions, it is not inconceivable that I could be wrong. And though by now the burden of proof must surely lie with those who have so severely mismanaged post-9/11 foreign policy, it still behooves me to focus not only on the course that reason and intuition compel me to argue for, but also on the little doubts that prod and niggle – thus protecting me from what otherwise might become just one more pious certainty of its own.

[Brett Alan Sanders]



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BRETT ALAN SANDERS:ON OPINIONS AND IDENTITY [Arte Retórica #4]

Publish On 06-22-2007 , 4:40 PM

This much delayed reflection on the popular conflation of opinion with identity begins with an illustrative anecdote from my personal file of “mis-meetings” (if I may borrow Martin Buber’s phrase) between dialogical or rhetorical partners:
 
Item #1: an 8/7/95 staff editorial in the local newspaper (Tell City, Indiana: The Perry County News) in which the writer endorses the fifty-year-old decision to use the atomic bomb on Japan, “unpopular as it may be now with the revisionists throughout the country.”
 
Item #2: an 8/14/95 guest column in which I make so bold as to disagree, questioning a number of the editorialist’s unexamined assumptions including the central one (implied in the dismissive “revisionists”) that the official account had not from the very outset been seriously questioned.
 
Item #3: a wounded patriot’s two-pronged counterattack in the form, first, of an 8/21/07 letter-to-the editor whose single-minded contention is that “if only one American life was saved by dropping the bombs, it was well worth it”; and second, of a stamped and sealed envelope – postmarked two days later; adorned with no fewer than two American-flag stickers in addition to the stamp – containing a clipping of that letter and addressed to me at my former address in rural Leopold.
 
Perhaps it bears mentioning that in my offending column I thought I’d taken considerable pains to distinguish between questioning a military or political decision and dishonoring our troops who gave or risked their lives in that conflict. In any case, I argued, to consider the possibility of our having erred is only to help us avoid such errors in the future; whereas an unreflective and unquestioning people “cannot be certain of its own liberties, let alone that the violences being justified to it are always necessary.”
 
That final point seems especially poignant these almost twelve years later. I was hardly surprised, though, at such an emotional reaction. Plausibly the writer was a war wife or even widow, deeply invested in the comforting assertions of an official story that lent meaning to her husband’s sacrifice. To suggest as I did that perhaps the war could have ended as much as several months to a year sooner might have seemed to her ears tantamount to declaring his sacrifice, in the final stages of that conflict, wholly in vain – devoid of meaning.
 
But a good part of the problem – this relative inability of ours to engage in civil and nuanced discussion of any controversy: from national defense and pre-emptive warfare to immigration; from gay rights or same-sex marriage to the (im)morality of abortion – is more deeply entrenched than the simple fact of any topical disruption itself. A larger problem involved in constructively approaching these issues lies in a collective attitude toward disagreement itself. It’s the mistaken notion that our most cherished beliefs and opinions define who we are; and that, consequently, any challenge to those ideas is a challenge and an affront to our very identity.
 
In the first chapter of the second edition of their book Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students (1999), Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee write of the belief of ancient teachers of rhetoric “that disagreement among human beings was inevitable, since individuals perceive the world differently from one another.” And further:
 
            They also assumed that since people communicate their perceptions through
            language – which is an entirely different medium than thoughts or perceptions –
            there was no guarantee that any person’s perceptions would be accurately
            conveyed to others. Even more important, the ancient teachers knew that people
            differ in their opinions about how the world works, so that it was often hard to
            tell whose opinion was the best. They invented rhetoric so that they would have
            means of judging whose opinion was most accurate, useful, or valuable.
 
 
Rhetoric, thus, “originates in disagreement,” but that fact “is ultimately a good thing, since its use allows people to make important choices without resorting to less peaceful means of persuasion such as coercion or violence.” Given our tendency to devalue such non-coercive means of persuasion, on the other hand, we correspondingly limit our options. This “intellectual habit” of confusing opinions and identity, Crowley and Hawhee write, “makes it seem as though people never change their minds about things like religion and politics. But as we all know, people do change their minds about these matters.” To persist in this habit, they contend, ultimately results in our inhabiting “a balkanized public sphere” in which “both our commonalities and our differences go unexamined. In a democracy, people must call the opinions of others into question and bring them into the light for examination and negotiation.” Otherwise, if decisions are not made “by means of public discourse,” they end up being made “for bad reasons, or for no reason at all.”
 
Who today can assert with any degree of credibility that our nation’s precipitous descent into the conflagration that is now Iraq wasn’t made within a rhetorical climate that favored coercive over truly open and reasoned discourse?
 
As Andrew J. Bacevich reminds me in a recent review-essay in The Nation (“The Semiwarriors,” April 23), George W. Bush and his imperial Presidency are only the symptom of our present malady, not the disease itself. “To imagine that getting rid of Bush will cure what ails the body politic,” Bacevich writes, “is akin to assuming that excising a tumor will alone suffice to cure cancer.”
 
The real problem, which he calls “semiwar” (“a term coined after World War II by James Forrestal to promote permanent quasi mobilization as the essential response to permanent global crisis”), is “more insidious.” Semiwarriors like Forrestal and Dean Acheson, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz,
 
            have viewed democratic politics as problematic. Debate means delay. To engage
            in give-and-take or compromise is to forfeit clarity and suggests a lack of
            conviction. The effective management of national security requires specialized
            knowledge, a capacity for clear-eyed analysis and above all an unflinching
            willingness to make decisions, whatever the cost. With the advent of semiwar,
            therefore, national security policy became the preserve of experts, few in number,
            almost always unelected, habitually operating in secret, persuading themselves
            that to exclude the public from such matters was to serve the public interest.
            After all, the people had no demonstrable “need to know.” In a time of perpetual
            crisis, the anointed role of the citizen was to be pliant, deferential and afraid.
 
 
Thus “the formulation of national security policy became less democratic,” and politics itself “an insider’s game, shielded from public scrutiny; henceforth, the politicking that counted occurred within the presidency behind closed doors. Keeping the Joint Chiefs on board became more important than gaining the assent of Congress.”
 
Underlying that problem, of course, is the fact that “we the people” allow it to be so. “As Americans increasingly embrace a minimalist definition of citizenship,” Bacevich writes, “their ability to influence government policy diminishes.”
 
A maximalist definition of citizenship, one that increases our ability to responsibly influence government policy, demands that as a nation we embrace the arts of rhetoric as a means of shared inquiry into the issues that face us. It demands a respect for language itself and a close and sustained attention to its nuances and its potentialities – to either clarify or to deceive. After all, it doesn’t follow from the fact that language can be used to ill effects that language isn’t also more suited than any of the alternatives to the purging of error and the building of a civilization worthy of the name.
 
Aristotle, in his monumental and for centuries definitive Rhetoric, puts it like this: “we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him.”
 
Aside from the objection that in most political matters there is no single right or wrong position, Aristotle is undoubtedly correct in asserting that rhetoric can be exercised in ways that are patently unfair, that obfuscate rather than enlighten. Indeed, then, it is necessary to employ persuasion on opposite sides of a question, but not only in order to confute the opponent’s deceptions but to uncover our own erroneous thinking, unconscious prejudice, and self-deceptions: we must be open to the possibility of being persuaded away from our most cherished convictions. In resolving the big problems of international relations in this age of terrorism, for instance, or the global crisis of climate change, the success of our venture depends unquestionably on how effective we are at airing the greatest possible variety of responsible and reasoned ideas and, from out of that unsettling chaos of democratic noise and confusion, arriving at the opinions best supported by the evidence and intuitions and ideas that come before us – the contingent truths that we can consent to and agree upon in the present context. To suppose that any single individual (or secretive cabal of like-minded individuals) might contain within its cloistered sanctity all the ideas necessary to choosing wisely in such matters of supreme importance to a free nation is perhaps the most dangerous of self-deceptions.
 
As I tell my students when they argue that, well, this is my experience and my opinion and therefore nobody can tell me that I’m wrong, the fact is that some opinions are indeed better than others – which themselves might range from well-considered but slightly flawed to absolutely and unredeemably foolish. To insist in this day that the Holocaust never occurred, for instance, or that the brains of black or brown folk are biologically inferior to those of northern Europeans, is to assert what cannot reasonably be entertained given the nature of the historical and scientific record. “Americans assume,” Crowley and Hawhee write, “that peoples’ opinions result from their personal experiences, and hence that those opinions are somehow ‘theirs’ – that they alone ‘own’ them. Hence, rhetors are often reluctant to engage in arguments about religion or politics or any other sensitive issue, fearing that listeners might take their views as personal attacks rather than as an invitation to discuss differences.” But if we fail to engage those most important arguments, we relinquish any voice we ever had in our own individual and collective destinies. We are left with no identity at all but that granted us by our own willing delusions and the purveyors of national or group opinion.
 
Which brings me back to my opening anecdote regarding the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It wasn’t my purpose to offend war widows and veterans or anyone else with unhealed wounds or delicate sensibilities, but to remain silent in such cases can only compound the ills that confront all of us together. While some in our society may ultimately be unable to face these matters in anything approaching a dispassionate or reasoned manner, a greater many of us will have to if collectively we are to avoid the foolish consistency in error which (to paraphrase Ralph Waldo Emerson) is the “hobgoblin” of small minds and petty statesmen. There will always be those who can’t bear to face such truths; privately it may be kindest to indulge them, to give up trying to engage them in a discussion that can only hurt or offend. But those of us who can be brought to reason, must come to the table and reason.  
 
How often have I heard the anti-revisionist historical argument, or its corollary that what’s done is done and any questioning of “should have” or “shouldn’t have” essentially moot? But how can it be moot when over sixty years later our national security experts or semiwarriors still won’t allow the question of whether or not to use nuclear weapons against our political enemies to be removed from the table? Or how can it be moot to question the President’s decision to invade Iraq when five years later – using essentially the same tired and discredited arguments as before – he persists, in clear defiance of popular and Congressional will and with the barest pretense of having considered other points of view, to escalate the same conflict and to contemplates similar actions in Iran?
 
In that 8/14/95 guest opinion in my local newspaper I relied heavily on a pair of books by radical-Left historian and former World War II combatant Howard Zinn, though at the same time I emphasized the variety of sources that he drew on – and encouraged readers to conduct their own investigations of those and other extant sources, numerous of which pre-dated the official text that was ultimately adopted.
 
Short months after writing that opinion I opened Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell’s Hiroshima in America: Fifty Years of Denial (1995), whose impressive documentation only tended to confirm me in my published view. In their introduction to that volume the authors quote Mary McCarthy’s statement in 1946 that Hiroshima had become “a hole in human history” (never mind her brief flirtation with the Communist Party a decade earlier: the point is that her questioning of an emerging and highly dubious official story – like so many others’ of more conservative credentials – comes much too early to be called revisionist). And then (albeit from thirty years later: as if there were a statute of limitations on such considerations!) this from physicist Ralph Lapp: “If the memory of things is to deter, where is that memory? Hiroshima has been taken out of the American conscience, eviscerated, extirpated.”
 
Earlier this year I stumbled on George Weller’s First Into Nagasaki (2006), edited and with an essay by his son Anthony Weller. “George Weller’s dispatches from Nagasaki, just four weeks after the bombing,” writes Walter Cronkite in his foreword to the book, “were censored and destroyed by General MacArthur,” the carbons that Weller kept subsequently lost and only recently discovered by his son. “We can only speculate as to [MacArthur’s] motives in imposing this total blackout to keep the United States and the rest of the world ignorant of the horrors of nuclear war,” Cronkite adds, but this volume serves (“at a time when our nation is again at war and our citizenry can only guess as to how thick are the blindfolds of censorship that distort the truth of our military engagements and our international commitments”) as “an important reminder, a warning to inspire civilian vigilance.”
 
In Hiroshima in America, Lifton and Mitchell spoke of their conviction “that we need not be permanently bound” to the destructive legacy of our earlier decision to use the atomic bombs but that instead, “by confronting it, and exploring what it has done to living in the late twentieth century, we embark on a path of renewal.” On a similar note, as the elder Weller suggests in a different book and the younger now places as an epigraph at the front of this new one: “It is through knowing the truth that the people discover their hidden will.” 
 
If those sound like truths we might come to agree on, let’s admit that there’s little hope of discovering such unity of purpose through a philosophy so insecure as to flee the disconcerting yet potentially bracing complexities of considered and passionate public discourse. If the truth shall make us free, why are we so afraid of it?
 


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BRETT ALAN SANDERS: ON UNSEEN WORLDS BOTH REAL AND POSSIBLE [Arte Retórica #5]

Publish On 12-09-2007 , 10:53 PM

I must apologize, first of all, for my silence these many months. I will put forward two excuses: 1) a surfeit of issues, all vexingly interwoven and complex, that combined to overwhelm me; and, 2) a perfectionist tendency that seemed to demand of each blog posting a fully realized and intricately sourced essay.
 
My son the online music critic reminds me that I should treat the blog less formally, like a journal entry: each one a snapshot of my most tentative thinking in the given moment; or like a piece of an ongoing conversation, like the newspaper column I contributed here in southernmost Indiana – between 1992 and ’94 – to the Perry County News.
 
As for the first problem, the cacophony of vexing issues, Jonathan Schell’s review-essay in the December 10 issue of The Nation, “A Colder War,” offers a rhetorical angle on the question of war (which ever seems to foreclose any substantive discussion and movement on peacetime concerns like healthcare and simple economic justice). It also bears on my increasingly pacifistic stance on the issue, a stance for which I am ever being dismissed as merely – or perversely – naive.
 
The assertion of my naiveté really boils down to this bit of advice that my good father used to give my adolescent self: “Brett, get your head out of the clouds and join the real world!”
 
The question I have dared to ask in that respect is this rather Quixotic one: who determines which of the plethora of proffered “real worlds” is, well, real? And this corollary: given the 20th-century’s inglorious history of “wars to end all wars” and peaces to be achieved only by the making of more war, with the principal effect of constantly escalating threats and a ramped-up rhetoric that would seem to be preparing us (for the illusion of security at home) for perpetual preemptive war on foreign soil, isn’t it about time that we seriously question these hawkish prophets-of-realpolitick’s own grip on reality?
 
And why are we so egregiously indifferent to the greater and lesser apocalypses we continue to wreak in others’ backyards?
 
In my short story “Mist Over Mount Fuji” (Tertulia Magazine, October 2005) the protagonist wonders about “Kenneth Burke’s ‘wan hope’ (in the latter half of the 20th century) that ‘in the sheer muddle of current international relations’ the very contradictoriness of competing nationalist aims might cancel each other out, thus preventing ‘a perfect fulfillment in a perfect Apocalyptic holocaust.’”          
 
Schell – while neither overstating the case for, or underestimating the case against – suggests a surprising historical precedent for a version of Burke’s hope, a version that is certainly less accidental and even slightly more vigorous.
 
Schell’s subject is the present installment (Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race) in Richard Rhodes’s ongoing series of books on the nuclear age in its most sweeping context. The revelation, for me, is Rhodes’s characterization of both Reagan and Gorbachev as (Schell’s words) “nuclear abolitionists”: “The unbearable tragedy is that when the two leaders came to within a hair’s breadth of agreeing to proceed to their common goal [...] the enterprise was tripped up by misleading advice from some of the very war fighters whose premises Reagan had rejected.”
 
More precisely, the characterization (Schell’s paraphrase again) of Reagan as “not only an unlikely nuclear abolitionist” but a man “guided by a visceral revulsion against nuclear weapons,” and one who “may have been unwilling to launch nuclear retaliation even if the United States were attacked with nuclear weapons first”; and likewise, that of Gorbachev, who “once participated in a war game simulating an American attack on the Soviet Union” and, “when the critical moment came, balked”: “I will not press the button even for training purposes,” Gorbachev purportedly said on that occasion.
 
As Schell writes of his own response to Rhodes’s account: “If these reports are correct, they leave half a century of strategic calculation, all of which has depended on the certitude of nuclear retaliation, a shambles. They suggest that a radical rethinking of the conventional wisdom regarding nuclear arms is not only decades overdue but also possible.”
 
They also suggest a vital reason for insisting on the rejection of our current rhetorics of attack, of character assassination, of talking heads shouting past each other and past the deep substance of the issues; to engage instead in a pragmatic and ultimately moral “rhetoric of assent” (as Wayne Booth called it), one that might allow us to move past our most visceral antagonisms and mutually condemnatory judgments.
 
I have always had mixed feelings about Ronald Reagan, who for all his misguided imperialism has often struck me as embodying something of the good-hearted and optimistic ideals of my own German American forebears. Likewise, my grandfather’s hero Teddy Roosevelt, that paradox of imperialist excess and humane progressivist passion.
 
Discovering a corresponding virtue in our present Commander-in-Chief, the ever reckless and ill-spoken George W. Bush, has clearly been a harder task for me. All the more reason to remind myself that civility and self-disciplined restraint in discourse, even at its most impassioned and urgent moments, is a virtue worthy of our constant pursuit.
 
Even if, in the heat of rhetorical battle, we sometimes vehemently – and without too much regard to delicacy – must call the moment’s adversary on his unconscious or conscious lies.
 
Afterwards, perhaps, we can also remember that adversary as a human figure, protagonist of a personal drama or tragedy that in greater or lesser degree resembles our own.
 


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BRETT ALAN SANDERS: On Our “Redlighted” Domestic Economy

Publish On 02-21-2008 , 10:52 AM

As a political essayist, Gore Vidal may indeed be something of a polemicist. He can strike one as a bit strong on the barbed and stinging epithet, for instance, as more inclined to preach to the choir than (by subtle arts of eloquence) to meet the unconverted where they stand and lead them beyond their preconceptions – or, better yet, to engage with them in a rhetoric of dialogue that might move us beyond even our own blind spots.
 
Sometimes, too, one gets the impression that Vidal might be glossing over something or other. As when, in his book Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Thunder’s Mountain Press / Nation Books, 2002), recycling a pair of essays published earlier in Vanity Fair, he slips into a post- rather than pre-9/11 perspective without explicit acknowledgment of that otherwise reasonable textual manipulation. One can’t help but wonder, at such moments, what else he might be playing fast and loose with.
 
And yet on the whole it seems to me that Vidal’s rhetoric – hot and occasionally sloppy as it may be – finds ample support in solid evidence that he painstakingly documents. Whereas anything slipping off of the forked tongues of essentially anyone in the Bush-Cheney Administration must be viewed immediately with exceedlingly jaundiced eyes.
 
In any case, in this book Vidal has convinced me of at least one thing: that had there been no Waco there would have been no Oklahoma City, and possibly (if less certainly) no 9/11. He argues with considerable persuasiveness, in fact, that the reasons foreign extremists so hate our government are clearly linked to those of ultra-“patriots” at home. The history that Vidal relates here of his accidental correspondence with Timothy McVeigh, and of the mainstream American media’s silence on the deeper significance of McVeigh’s particular madness, are of considerable importance. And they have everything in the world to do with the grave situation that our nation presently faces.
 
A final point: Vidal’s book, as made clear by its major focus on events that took place well before the attacks of 9/11, is not just more ammunition against the present Administration. Its vitriol is directed at a whole “military-industrial complex” (to use former-President Eisenhower’s phrase), and at the political philosophy that has grown up to support and protect it. Bill Clinton – as, by implication, candidate Hillary, who voted to enable the latest Iraq invasion – comes in for a good deal of criticism in its pages. And this meshes perfectly with so much that I have been reading over the past several years – in sources as diverse and credible as The Nation, Mother Jones, The Washington Spectator, the perfectly ecumenical and diplomatic Washington Newsletter and website of the Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL) ... to name a few.
 
***
 
Of course, the truths that most affect us – and potentially transform us – are sometimes better revealed within the passion and subjectivity of a well-told narrative (whether factual or fictional or even mythical) than in the mere accumulation of data. All utterance is subject to interpretation, after all, and thus to argument. A truly valid rhetorical practice must therefore transcend the mistaken objectivity of mere “facts” (or “factoids”) lined up by polemicists on either side of a political divide.            
 
One such narrative, for me, is the one that Sara Gruen weaves in her novel Water for Elephants (Algonquin, 2006), whose subject, briefly stated, is an old man’s remembrance of his Great Depression-era stint on a circus crew. It is arguably as harrowing in its revelations of humankind’s potential depravity and grandeur as, say, The Kite Runner, whose demons one might carelessly dismiss as merely exotic, or pertinent only to those barbaric lands to which our nation’s best and bravest are presently bringing civilization and democracy.
 
In Gruen’s novel there is everything: from the most sordid to the most redeeming and love-saturated sex; from soulless violence and cruelty to courage and heroism, to a powerful commitment to the keeping of promises – a simple human endurance, in short, never wholly erased by the humiliating anti-climax of crushing poverty and oppression, or of old age. The particular love story at center is deeply poignant, as is the nuanced characterization of the protagonist as an old man. And from the opening sequence, in which what one thinks has just happened has not happened really (or at least not as imagined), the suspense never wavers.
 
In short: a fabulous novel, deeply imagined and researched, revealing our not-so-distant national history in ways that our real and imagined progress tends to obscure. The story is firmly rooted in the facts and down-to-earth realities of a cruel era, all of which it transcends. The particular, the immediate, the national and local, is made universal. And closer at hand to Khaled Hosseini’s Afghanistan of fewer decades past than we might have wished to imagine.
 
For that matter, as I read Lizzy Ratner’s article (in the February 25 issue of The Nation) about the homeless and maimed in the deepening shadow of New Orleans’s post-Katrina face lift, Gruen’s Depression-era America seems frighteningly current.
 
* * *
 
“This is a Dickens novel that we’re living in right now,” says one of Ratner’s journalistic protagonists. “It’s like A Tale of Two Cities.”
 
While Donald Trump’s International Hotel and Tower New Orleans (“number one address for elegant living”) rises heavenward like its mythic Babylonian counterpart, the huddled masses down below are cast out of the housing market, which is being rebuilt for a whole other demographic. In a city whose housing market, pre-Katrina, was over half rental, and in which 52,000 rental units were destroyed in the flood, (not to mention another “4,500 relatively unscathed public housing apartments” bulldozed by HUD), a whopping 85 percent of federal aid has gone to home owners while the fair-market rate for rental properties has soared out of the working class’s means.
 
“The result,” Ratner reports, “is that the funds allocated by Washington’s recovery gurus to rebuild the Gulf area are expected to restore only 43 percent of Louisiana’s rental apartments – and only 37 percent of the city’s most affordable rental housing, according to PolicyLink, a national advocacy group promoting social and economic justice.”
 
“Poor people just have not been the priority in this recovery,” says another of Ratner’s sources. “And I think the fact that this situation hasn’t been treated with the urgency it deserves is exactly why we’re seeing these huge homeless camps in New Orleans, why so many people are living in abandoned buildings and why so many people are suffering in Third World conditions in the United States of America two and a half years after Katrina.”
 
In Gruen’s novel, the most vulnerable members of the circus crew are simply “redlighted,” a euphemism for being thrown off a moving train under cover of night. Isn’t what is happening to the vulnerable in New Orleans (not to mention Mexico’s corn farmers, or countless victims of Bush-Cheney’s “homeowner society” in the present foreclosure crisis) simply a more sophisticated form of the same practice?
 
“As for local leaders,” Ratner reports, “they have sometimes seemed less interested in resettling the poorest Katrina survivors than in finding ways to keep them out of their neighborhoods. In numerous instances [...] elected officials have pushed bans on multifamily apartment complexes – measures that would effectively freeze poor, often African-American renters out of those ZIP codes.”
 
Woody Guthrie, writing of Mexican Americans’ plight in an era of cheap bracero labor, sang it like this: “Some of us are illegal and some just not wanted.”
 
Where, in this Presidential election year, is the candidate who can truly claim the mantle of champion of these most vulnerable constituencies – and, since we are all afloat on the same flood water, of the rest of us not yet so desperate?
 
* * *
 
I would like to answer: Barack Obama! though so far he has not wholly convinced me. As it is, I fear he will be too timid on the single issue that ties our hands from adequately addressing all the others: our maniacal national obsession with a militarism that is only making us increasingly insecure and divided at home.
 
Obama has likewise seemed too timid on socioeconomic issues, a bit too distanced from his earlier grassroots activism which should be one of his greatest strengths (and at least partial rejoinder to charges of inexperience). But how is anyone really going to fix those crises anyway, without simultaneously – and decisively – confronting the sacred cow of rampant military spending?
 
There will be no universal healthcare without a vast reordering of national priorities, just as there can be no effective homeland security in a militarily over-extended country pockmarked by expanding ghettos of the discarded.
 
And yet, as The Nation editorializes this month in its Presidential endorsement, if a truly progressive movement is to be built up at this time around anyone, Barack Obama does seem the more likely candidate than Hillary Clinton, whose post-9/11 hawkishness only highlights an intimacy with her husband’s Administration and with the whole power structure of the Bush-Clinton-Bush decades that makes it hard to imagine her stepping out in decidedly new directions.
 
It is true, as my colleague Rosa Martha Villarreal observed recently in her own corner of “Tertullian’s Blog,” that Obama has been disconcertingly vague in his platform for change, which in the minds of Latino voters might evoke the image of a south-of-the-border populism whose own beautiful oratory has so often failed to deliver on its promise. And thus Rosa worries about a November match-up between Obama, who seems to fare less well than Clinton among the increasingly important demographic of Hispanic voters, and John McCain, whose manly posture on military policy and liberal approach to immigration resonate within a community whose patriotism for these United States of America is embodied in the great proportion of their family members who have served and continue serving honorably in our armed forces.
 
Be all that as it may (I will resist the temptation to prognosticate about Ohio and Texas), a McCain candidacy in November faces some formidable obstacles of its own. Not least of these is embodied in his recent statement (perhaps fueled by an inability to see past the personal and national trauma of Vietnam) that he would feel comfortable with staying another hundred years in Iraq. Rhetorical flourish or not, that hyperbole is a many-edged sword that cuts too close to the bone, and leaves his judgment seriously in question.
 
Leaving aside, then, the observation of some that McCain is not attracting the independent voters whom he needs in order to win in November (Obama, in his latest run of victories has been winning great numbers of those independent voters), it seems to me by no means impossible to bring a majority of Hispanic voters – at least in the absence of a Clinton on the national ballot – over to Obama.
 
If this is to happen, of course, Obama can only help himself by reaching out more directly to those communities – and, for that matter, certainly after the Democratic Convention but preferably before – by getting bolder and more specific in his proposed initiatives.
 
Which leads me to this final observation: the real push for change, the real impetus behind a Candidate and potential-President Obama with the courage to push national dialogue and policy in truly new and wiser directions, will have to come from us down under. It is up to us to persuade, not only Hispanic voters in California and Texas but socially and militarily conservative patriots in my historically “red” state of Indiana, that regardless of the fine points of policy that we ultimately craft, it is in none of our interest to maintain an economy that depends on sending increasing numbers of our children, forever and ever amen, to die like the patriots they are – so that the filthily and larcenously rich can become ever more secure in their ill-gotten gain.

 

------Brett Alan Sanders



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BRETT ALAN SANDERS: On the Rooseveltian Rhetoric of Barack Obama [Arte Retórica #7]

Publish On 03-31-2008 , 6:59 PM

Very little if anything, in the realm of political discourse, is actually self-evident, regardless of what our nation’s Founders held to be so when they declared its independence from foreign tyranny. Nowhere is this dictum more evident than in the question of whether Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton should be the Democratic Party’s nominee in 2008.
 
Even the clarity of Obama’s March 18 speech entitled “A More Perfect Union,” though it is central to my decision to wholeheartedly endorse him, has been less than persuasive to some (though perhaps the very desperation of the Clinton campaign’s increasingly negative rhetoric will help to make a case for her Democratic opponent).
 
To me, in any case, it was simply the most direct, intelligent, nuanced, and courageous piece of oratory to be addressed on the subject by any contemporary politician. And even if the next two speeches, on Iraq and the economy, were neither as perfect nor as forthright in confronting the whole problem of militarism as it affects our nation, the three of them together were more than sufficient to persuade me that Obama does have the right stuff to warrant the Democratic nomination: at the least he possesses the intellectual acuity, as well as the moral fortitude, to address an issue in all its complexity.
 
Rather than recite point-by-point what Obama said, or the great deal that has already been written in response to his speech, let me just provide these links to a particularly favorable New York Times report and to the transcript of the speech itself, which probably you have already seen.
 
And now to venture off in this slightly different direction.
 
The Rev. Jesse Jackson, whatever his faults (real and perceived), makes a valid point when he suggests in the April 7 issue of The Nation, in reference to the legacy of Franklin D. Roosevelt and his New Deal, that the engine of change does not alone lie in even the most enlightened President by himself, in a single woman or man with all the right ideas, fully developed. For progressive public policy to reassert itself and to extend its reach to all Americans, he argues, “at least two key ingredients” are required: “an enlightened President and an energized electorate.”
 
“In 1932,” he continues, “Roosevelt did not run on a New Deal platform. He was the best option. The workers at the plant gates, they were the answer. A combination of an enlightened President, an energized electorate – that’s the coalition.
 
“In 1960, Dr. King chose Kennedy over Nixon. Neither ran on a public accommodation platform. That came from Birmingham. In 1964, neither Johnson nor Goldwater ran on a Voting Rights Act platform. That came from Selma.
 
“When we, the people, coalesce with an enlightened President, we can change America, from the bottom up, from the grassroots to the treetops, for the better.”
 
If we feel, as I do, that the military economy is an even bigger issue than Obama has made it, and that a policy of simultaneously withdrawing (sort of) from Iraq and ramping up overall troop levels in Afghanistan and elsewhere is at cross-purposes with itself, then we must create the awareness at the grassroots where we are – and elect a President (and a Congress) who might most likely be shaped by a wind of change emanating from beneath them.  
 
Writing in the same issue of The Nation, in an essay entitled “Why the New Deal Matters,” Richard Parker makes a further observation which might also be extrapolated to the subject of Obama’s campaign.
 
“Few historians today,” Parker writes, “think FDR had a finely tuned policy agenda in the back of his mind at any point during his twelve years in the White House.” He goes on to quote Eliot Janeway, who suggests that to Roosevelt “the important question was the participation of a nation in its own defense, not the administrative planning for this participation.” This in the context of the war effort, but it applies as well to what historian Richard Hofstadter called the “chaos of experimentation” that surrounded the imperfect yet remarkably productive hodgepodge of projects and public works that became the New Deal – a chaos of invention which, more than any single-minded war effort alone, quite arguably created the unprecedented prosperity of the post-war period.
 
Of the qualities of that earlier President which facilitated the nation’s participation in reshaping its social contract, Parker cites “his ability to project a sense of trust in people’s ability to rise to common needs and dreams, plus his capacity as democratic leader to help them find the means to triumph – that defined Roosevelt’s genius. And it’s crucial for us to recognize why his style of ‘democratic leadership’ was and is more challenging than ‘leadership of a democracy’ or of business leadership or military leadership or most kinds of political leadership touted as ‘what we need today.’”
 
And this addendum, perhaps most significant:
 
“Crucial among the gifts of a true democratic leader, as FDR clearly was, is the ability to share not so much policies but stories, parables that incorporate moral and ethical vision, narratives of who we are and where we came from, and why we are together and where we can go, and what we can achieve if we work together.”
 
This in response to those who keep harping on Obama’s supposed inexperience, or on the absence of a complete program. It remains paradoxically true, as acknowledged in my last blog (in which I more tentatively favored Obama over Clinton), that this preference of stories and visions over detailed policy must not come in the form of a hollow, smoke-and-mirrors populism. But there were no smoke and mirrors in Obama’s speech on race, which (despite the perfectly valid rhetorical positioning of red-white-and-blue to make him seem Presidential) rested principally on the subtlety of his intellect: logos wielded in perfect balance with restrained, unhysterical pathos in the creation of what might arguably become (pardon me what some will think a touch of hyperbole) a Rooseveltian ethos
           
Be all that as it may (I might, of course, be deceived), it seems to me that the weight of negativity being dumped on Obama at this juncture – just over a week after his most defining speech – continues to amount to little more than the red herrings of lack of experience and relative “electability” – with at center stage the shameless distraction of his association with the monstrous caricature that has become the Rev. Wright.
 
To which unholy hullabaloo let me add some observations of my own.
 
First, while Senator Clinton disingenuously asserts that, all personal and human loyalty aside, she would have immediately quit the Rev. Wright and his church (while James Carville, on her campaign’s behalf, is for a much lesser disloyalty dismissing Gov. Richardson as some wholly despicable – and thus irrelevent – Judas Iscariot), an additional bit of contextualization might be in order.
 
Implicit in quitting the Rev. Wright’s church is quitting the Rev. Wright’s church community, is it not? To do that – to hop from congregation to congregation; without regard to neighborhood or community – may be a comfortable practice for largely white, increasingly mobile, and vaguely non-denominational Protestants, but is anathema, I would suppose, within the tradition of an African American church.
 
Correct me if I am wrong (I am neither black nor otherwise particularly expert in black experience). Likewise forgive me the lack of precision that necessarily comes from speaking, for a moment, in generalities, whether about the so-called “African American church” or about a white Protestant experience that is by no means homogeneous. But it seems to me true, if not immediately self-evident, that to some people the concept of family is much broader than it might be to others, and that a whole congregation of variously flawed church-goers might to any number of someones, black or white or whatever shade of brown, fall comfortably within that designation.
 
Senator Clinton is not alone, of course, in expressing what she would have done in Senator Obama’s shoes. Though given her stature as a national leader she is surely more culpable than many. I would not go so far as to call her a racist, though her suppositions in this matter, divorced from and seemingly indifferent to the contextual issues that Obama raised in his speech, are almost undeniably racist in nature. That she use them merely as a Machiavellian political maneuver, devoid of particularly racial belief or ideology on her part, does not make them any less so – as she very well knows.
 
In the spirit of national conciliation, which is the very spirit of Obama’s contextualization of the Rev. Wright issue, I would emphasize that distinction between racist people and racist notions. Where base political motives are not at play, I suspect that it is largely a question of point of view, of our allowing ourselves to be blinded by what rhetorician Kenneth Burke called the “terministic screens” of our customary and unconsciously automatic ways of perceiving the world.
 
The allusion to Burke’s metaphor demands a further fleshing out, which I must leave for the most part to a future column. But consider this by way of illustrative example: it is easy enough for a white man, living in isolation from any larger community of color, to take the absolutist position that Obama must categorically, and convincingly, disown the Rev. Wright or ... or nothing: end of discussion! But consider the possibility that, viewed from the perspective of a black colleague of similar educational background and professional status, the reality might appear considerably different, and for good reason, hateful as some of the Rev. Wright’s words might also seem to him.
 
The problem with absolute denunciations of the sort demanded of Obama is that they brook no departure from their carved-in-stone rigidity, while life itself requires nothing at all if not flexibility. Some have argued that to have not disowned the Rev. Wright once and for all is itself a divisive act. Yet how so, if Obama has only pointed the way beyond division, by acknowledging the very complexity of the issue, a complexity that includes family members and friends and neighbors – and sometimes our very selves – which are diverted, from time to time, by (consciously or not) racist, sexist, classist, or other prejudiced and prejudicial judgments?
 
It should take only a little imagination, or at most a learned capacity for inquiry and for the setting aside of personal prejudice in order to listen – really listen! – to the other’s seemingly incomprehensible experience – to understand why some black people, in the relative privacy of their families and neighborhoods, their churches and larger communities, might entertain some harbored resentments about their place in the American narrative. And why, therefore, it is essential that neither Obama’s former pastor nor the most obnoxious anti-patriot among us – black white or brown – be deliberately demonized, cast out of the community of national discourse.
 
We gain more valuable insight about ourselves (as I believe it says somewhere in the Bible) from those who spitefully use and abuse us than from those who flatter and praise us.
 
It is one thing, in other words, to hold the discourse of the Rev. Wrights of the world to a higher standard, but let’s not forget the cynical discourse of those in positions of public trust – in the media and elsewhere – who, in the hopes of keeping one black man’s star from rising, continue to fan the flames of another’s most inflammatory statements. And let’s not pretend that Obama’s ill-spoken former pastor is any more a monster than you or I, or his errors any less redeemable.
 
All of which only serves to underscore Obama’s very wise assertion that the only way past such misunderstandings is to face each other and talk about them. No, my friends, we can’t just pretend that the ill-spoken other – obnoxious as they may seem to us – are somehow irrelevent, simply evil-speakers or -doers, to be brushed aside like so many cockroaches or Middle Eastern terrorists.
 
Which brings me to another reason I have for endorsing Obama: he is not, as he has boldly stated, afraid to sit down with our enemies: even with Raúl Castro, the evil bastard; and, presumably, with the President of Iran or of Venezuela, who might thus become slightly less demonic and (dare we hope!) cease to consider us blood enemies.
 
If this is political naiveté, as charged by those who have led us to the brink of the present abyss in our international relations, consider how well fifty years of sword-rattling, economic sanctions, and foiled assassination attempts have served us in reshaping the politics of Cuba. Consider whether or not the Fidel Castro we have had to deal with this past half century has been made more or less a cruel and entrenched dictator by the constant threat of the Superpower-to-the-North’s oft-thundered denunciations of him and his revolution, which was fought, after all, against a dictator scarcely less cruel. And consider how much safer we are (or are not) today from a resurgent and increasingly extremist Iran, which in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 had shown itself more inclined to help than to harm us.
 
I, for one, would like to try another way, and am feeling just manic enough to really hope that Obama – whatever his or his campaign’s imperfections – might be just the enlightened President to energize this American electorate toward the sort of grassroots activisim that can reclaim for we-the-people the reins of democratic-republican government.
 
So we might have some work ahead of us in convincing, for instance, the diverse Hispanic (or Latino) population – perhaps no one more than anti-Castro Cuban America – that an Obama Presidency is infinitely more in our common interests than a McCain Presidency, and that diplomacy promises more than force of arms in addressing international ills from the Caribbean to the Middle East. But surely, within those communities themselves, we have no shortage of eloquent voices who will be willing to work with the rest of us at that rhetorical task.
 
Can Barack Obama defeat John McCain in November? Of course he can. The real impediments to that outcome are, first, a foolish continuation of the present in-fighting, and second, the failure of those who claim to want a Democratic victory to move beyond the trees of strategy considerations to the forest of vision.
 
If the Clintons really love their country as much as they say they do, (and I have no reason to believe that they don’t), they should sooner rather than later stop the dirty Machiavellian politics that are presently debasing both Democratic candidates and sowing the seeds of disunity and bitterness.
 
The rest of us who wish, in whatever small way we can, to help shape a more constructive electoral discussion, might likewise do well to start spending a good deal more time on elucidating the reasons that Obama should beat McCain than on quibbling over the reasons that he might not.
 
And on solving the imaginative problem of how to engage an electorate still too heavily swayed or disenchanted (by the quasi-populist platitudes of Fox Newsspeak and its equivalents) in a substantive discussion of key issues, a dialogue of the caliber of what Obama in his potentially paradigm-shifting speech on race has shown to be possible.
 
I see no reason that a majority of Americans can’t be brought around to that higher vision of American values.
 
Do you?
 
 


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BRETT ALAN SANDERS: Kenneth Burke and the Terministic Screen [Arte Retórica #8]

Publish On 04-28-2008 , 12:17 PM

In my last number of this series of essays on the rhetorical arts, I alluded (in the context of Barack Obama’s speech on race, and of the ongoing flak over his association with the Rev. Wright) to rhetorician Kenneth Burke’s concept of “terministic screens.” The terminology, as I then suggested, deserves elaboration.
 
Burke (1897-1993), a Pittsburgh native and member of the Bohemian group of Greenwich Village writers that included e. e. cummings and Edna St. Vincent Millay, was most influential (as Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg put it in the 2nd Edition of their anthology The Rhetorical Tradition) “in developing rhetorical literary criticism and in analyzing the ways in which language systems – philosophical, political, literary, and religious – describe and influence human motives.” Literature, to Burke, like any other form of written or spoken discourse, is essentially rhetorical in nature, constituting within itself a sort of symbolic or “dramatistic” action. It is within this context, in his book Language as Symbolic Action, that he introduces the terminology in question.
 
“When I speak of ‘terministic screens,’” Burke writes, “I have particularly in mind some photographs I once saw. They were different photographs of the same objects, the difference being that they were made with different color filters. Here something so ‘factual’ as a photograph revealed notable distinctions in texture, and even in form, depending upon which color filter was used for the documentary description of the event being recorded.
 
“Similarly, a man has a dream. He reports his dream to a Freudian analyst, or a Jungian, or an Adlerian, or to a practitioner of some other school. In each case, we might say, the ‘same’ dream will be subjected to a different color filter, with corresponding differences in the nature of the event as perceived, recorded, and interpreted. (It is a commonplace that patients soon learn to have the kind of dreams best suited to the terms favored by their analysts.)”
***
And so it tends to go in our divergent political and social plottings and dreamings. We see things through the particular terministic screens, or filters, of our paticular group, our particular bias, our collective hopes and fears, with some variation, always, for individual temperament and for the complex of motives and perceptions, conscious and unconscious, that make us up.
 
Consider, by way of illustration, contributing editor Eric Umansky’s cover story, “Lost Over Iran,” in the March/April 2008 edition of the Columbia Journalism Review. In introducing the story, in their pithy “Opening Shot,” the editors allude to the steroids-in-baseball story: “It was ten years ago when an AP writer named Steve Wilstein noticed a brown bottle labled “androstenodione” sitting in the locker of Mark McGwire, the home-run slugger, and began asking questions. It took far longer for steroids to become The Story, after prosecutions and official inquiries. As ESPN The Magazine put it in a special report in 2005 ‘Who knew? We all knew,’ including ‘journalists who “buried the lead” and told jokes among themselves about the newly muscled.’ Journalists like to think they shape the nation’s agenda,” CJR’s editors continue, “but we often wait for officialdom to frame the discussion.” Which brings them to Umansky’s piece on Iran: “We were all stunned when the nation’s intelligence community determined earlier this year that a leading member of the Axis of Evil is not actively pursuing nuclear weapons after all, and actually is behaving quite rationally. Who knew?”
 
Consider a brief sketch of the evidence Umansky reports:
 
Fall 2001. “Iran was cooperating with the U.S. to a degree that hadn’t been seen since the days of the Shah. It was, as Ray Takeyh, author of Hidden Iran, put it, ‘the underreported story of the first episode of America’s war on terrorism.’” This helpfulness included Iran’s offering of the use of its airstrips in emergencies and to assist in the rescue of lost pilots, to help negotiate with the Northern Alliance, and to help train (under U.S. supervision) the Afghan army. “James Dobbins, then the Bush administration’s special envoy to Afghanistan, recounted his shock at just how cooperative the Iranians were being in a May 2004 Washington Post op-ed. Diplomats from a number of countries were helpful, wrote Dobbins, but ‘none were moreso than the Iranians.’ He duly reported the overtures back to Washington where, Dobbins noted, ‘none was ever taken up.’”
 
May 2003. Perhaps “motivated by the speed with which the U.S. toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime.” Iran offers, through various diplomatic channels, a “Grand Bargain” that “put nearly everything on the table, from support for Hezbollah to Iran’s nuclear energy program.” Gary Slick, Persian Gulf specialist and former member of the National Security Council, reports having “talked to people in Iran who were responsible for editing and sending” the initial offer, which “was cleared at the highest levels as an offer in good faith.”
 
July 2003. The Financial Times follows up with diplomatic correspondent Guy Dinmore’s report on Iran’s offer and the U.S.’s failure to engage: “‘We are not reaching out at this point,’ a State Department official told Dinmore. 
 
“And there the story sat.” Dinmore, nearly a year later, clarifies that there had been other feelers prior to the reported fax from the Swiss ambassador to Iran, “Washington’s designated middleman for communications.” But nothing more until “roughly eighteen months after Dinmore’s first report” when “more intriguing revelations” showed up as part of a larger Washington Post investigation.
 
Fall 2004. Some sixty paragraphs into the Post article, the following points: that Iran, through Swiss Ambassador Tim Guldimann, wants to talk about its nuclear program; that U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton declares his government “not interested in a grand bargain”; that, despite eighteen months of periodic discussions about Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush administration’s instructions to U.S. negotiators were clear: “Don’t bring up the nukes.”
 
“Reporters seemed interested in the story,” Umansky reports, “and later – when a source began providing documentary proof – some tried to write it. But ‘editors slashed it down to something like the last paragraph of a larger story,’ says Trita Parsi, the Iran expert and former congressional staffer who provided the documents. ‘It was something that went against people’s assumptions.’”
 
March 2006. Barbara Slavin of USA Today obtains such documents and is poised to write the story, but her editor puts her off until May. “It was at the end of a story about Iran President Ahmadinejad’s letter” to Bush, she writes, “and said basically, ‘Oh, by the way, this isn’t the first time Iran has offered to negotiate.’” Later in 2006, one report on the offer appears on page A16 of The Washington Post: “Even though the offer had never really made news,” Umansky writes, “it was considered old news.”
 
As for the nation’s most august newspaper, the New York Times, Umansky reports that “[n]o story on the ‘Grand Bargain’ ever appeared” in its news pages. But he quotes the Times’s columnist Nicholas Kristof, who, writing in early 2007, concludes that “neo-cons killed [an] incipient peace process.” And adds this insightful analysis:
 
“In general, what journalists are best at covering is what a president or prime minister said yesterday, [not] complicated processes that don’t happen in one day, that can’t easily be condensed into a bumper sticker.... But it was something we really needed to pursue, especially when it looked like we might bomb Iran because of the view that they were utterly recalcitrant, incapable of a diplomatic solution. These documents were an important bit of counter-evidence.”
***
Aside from Kristoff’s observation about journalists’ general neglect of stories that involve “complicated processes that don’t happen in one day, that can’t easily be condensed into a bumper sticker” (cause or effect of the larger population’s presumed attention-deficit disorder?), most striking to me in the larger context of this moment’s essay is Parsi’s succinct explanation of editors’ failure to pounce on the story of Iran’s proffered “Grand Bargain”: “It was something that went against people’s assumptions.”
           
In other words, as Burke might have put it (and if I might be forgiven for mixing olfactory and visual metaphors), they were put off its scent by the particular color of their terministic screens, or filters.
                       
So are we all, from time to time. The only cure is constant vigilance and self-awareness. And in these grave matters of social and political importance, such awareness might well start with a consciousness of the metaphoric or symbolic essence of words, which are never precisely the things or ideas they represent. Hence, in Burke’s “dramatistic” view of language as symbolic action, “even the most unemotional scientific nomenclatures” are necessarily subject to persuasion. For they do not speak for themselves; they are subject to manipulation, whether unwitting or witting, too often cynical.
 
“Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality,” Burke explains prior to introducing the concept of terministic screens, “by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality.”
 
He goes on to illustrate with an anecdote:
 
“In his seventh Provincial Letter, Pascal satirizes a device which the Jesuits of his day called ‘directing the intention.’ For instance, to illustrate satirically how one should ‘direct the intention,’ he used a burlesque example of this sort: Dueling was forbidden by the Church. Pascal satirically demonstrated how, by ‘directing the intention,’ one could both take part in a duel and not violate the Church injunction against it. Thus, instead of intentionally going to take part in a duel, the duelists would merely go for a walk to a place where the duel was to be held. And they would carry guns merely as a precautionary means of self-protection in case they happened to meet an armed enemy. By so ‘directing the intention,’ they could have their duel without having transgressed the Church’s thou-shalt-not’s against dueling. For it was perfectly proper to go for a walk; and in case one encountered an enemy bent on murder, it was perfectly proper to protect oneself by shooting in self-defense.
 
“I bring up this satirically excessive account of directing the intention,” Burke continues, “in the hopes that I can thereby settle for less when discussing the ways in which ‘terministic screens’ direct the attention. Here the kind of deflection I have in mind concerns simply the fact that any nomenclature necessarily directs the attention into some channels rather than others. In one sense, this likelihood is painfully obvious. A textbook on physics, for instance, turns the attention in a different direction from the textbook on law or psychology. But some implications of this terministic incentive are not so obvious.”
 
Which takes us full circle to this essay’s initially-cited passage on photographs and dream
interpretation.
***
 
And now this final rumination on the subject of Umansky’s CJR report on Iran, and its implications (in terms of terministic screens and the directing of political intentions) for the ongoing Presidential race.
 
It is hard to imagine that, in “killing [the] incipient peace process” represented at least potentially by Iran’s proposed “Grand Bargain,” the “neo-cons” that Kristoff cites weren’t engaged themselves – at least some of them – in some deliberately cynical directing of imperialist intentions (and of a variously witting and unwitting nation’s attention) toward a mischief of far greater reach and consequence than that of Pascal’s linguistically hairsplitting duelists. If some of them, even the President, should prove more bunglers than intentionalists, too proud or stubborn to admit error and renounce the maniacal quixotism of their mistaken course, their responsibility is surely no less great.
 
And is it really so hard to imagine that, from the Iranian perspective, U.S. maneuvers in the region might well merit some sword-rattling and manical quixotries of their own? Including war blogger Bill Roggio’s documentation in a December 2007 story (as elaborated, in the same issue of CJR, in Paul McLeary’s “Blogging the Long War”) on “the ‘ratlines’ many American military officials say Iran was using to move supplies and weapons into Iraq”: given U.S. unwillingness to deal, and threats of military action against Iran’s peaceful nuclear program, what (from the other side of that particular colored filter) have they got to lose?
 
As for the current U.S. Presidential candidates, none are exempt from the caution that Burke’s metaphor implies.
 
McCain, for his part, perhaps to some degree confused by the filter of his ordeal as a POW in Vietnam, seems hopelessly confused about the real complexities and the multiplicity of nationalistic perspectives that must come to bear in any rational foreign policy; and yet one wonders, too, what more cynical intentionality lies in, for instance, his Clintonian hairsplitting over the meaning of is in the question of campaign finance.
 
Hillary Clinton, for that matter, inspires little more confidence on questions of war and peace, given her ties to the old power structure and, more immediately, the silly intentionality that seems evident in her stories about sniper fire in Bosnia.
 
But Obama can’t escape his share of criticism here, either. He would do particularly well, I think, to take a much harder look at the questionable assumptions – and the variously intentionalist or terministic screens – that have him speaking, in almost the same breath, of a swift but measured withdrawal from Iraq and a further military buildup in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
 
And all of this without directly touching on the grave and interrelated issues of the global economy and our looming ecological crisis. We will all very quickly have to get out of our comfort zones on this trio of potentially apocalyptic issues. If we persist in looking exclusively (or even primarily) through our own limited national and regional and individual spectacles, to put Burke’s metaphor in a more familiar vein, it is difficult to imagine how we are going to get out of the tremendous mess we are in. 
 
------Brett Alan Sanders   


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BRETT ALAN SANDERS: Beyond Mere Rhetoric, Part 2 [Arte Retórica #10]

Publish On 10-21-2008 , 11:34 AM


Author’s note: While the bulk of the conclusion of this essay was written in late July, within a week of my submission of the first part, the brief elaboration on Socrates, Plato, and Cicero has only come together these two and a half months later. Please pardon the unconscionable delay.

Too often our way of talking about the increasing fragmentation of publics is to throw up our hands: “You can’t talk with them because they have gone beyond the pale.” In other words,we decide to declare war. Though I hold no great hope that a revitalized rhetoric can ever eliminate “warfare” – lying, trickery, blackmail, and physical persuasions – I think the command upon us is inescapable: we must build new rhetorical communities, we must find a common faith in modes of argument, or every institution we care about will die.
– Wayne C. Booth


In concluding the first part of this argument on behalf of a revitalized civic  rhetoric, as promulgated by and practiced by such as the Greek Isocrates, I alluded hopefully to Barack Obama as a good rhetor and orator – his discourse, at least, would seem to reflect a real yearning for the not wholly impractical idealisms he speaks of.

Editor Katrina vanden Heuvel, writing in the July 21/28 issue of The Nation, suggests that, “as a constitutional lawyer with a long record of teaching and action on electoral reform and voting rights, he may well be the best prepared President since the founders to take on the electoral process” – which she defines as central to any “holistic democracy agenda” that the larger progressive community might urge on him and pursue during his still-hypothetical Presidency.

Such an agenda, joined and championed by a plethora of Wayne Booth’s “new rhetorical communities,” would “unify and amplify” such particular issues as healthcare, environment, economic injustice, and rampant militarism, which are generally viewed separately instead of as the single multifaceted organism that they form.

“What would a core agenda be?” she asks. “How about Just Democracy – a program to ensure that every vote gets counted, that money talks no louder than the many and that every challenger gets to make his or her case? Media reform is a piece of the puzzle, of course [...] So too is party reform: how can a party that calls itself ‘Democratic’ make unelected superdelegates defining players in its nominating process? There is no need to separate those necessary reforms, but my focus here is on the most important elements of a program to revitalize our electoral process.”

Properly understood, it strikes me that this agenda – which, if there is any doubt, I endorse – also constitutes a program to revitalize the sorry state of our political rhetoric, which cannot flourish in a climate of conscious and unconscious suppression of votes and of considered (or inconsiderate) dissenting opinions. 
___


In the cover essay in the August 2008 Harper’s Magazine, Thomas Frank examines what might well be considered the central dynamic of the Bush-Cheney anti-rhetoric, in this case by reference to the revolutionary student “conservatism” of the 1980s.

“What the rising conservative sensibility of those years treasured above all else,” Frank writes, “was ‘confrontation’ with the left. It called for a quasi-military victory over liberalism; it would have no truck with civility or fair play; and it made heroes out of outrage-courting lib-fighters like Reagan’s communications director Pat Buchanan, the organizer Howard Phillips, and the young Jack Abramoff.

“The first and most notable characteristic of this new militancy was an air of swaggering truculence. There are, of course, bullies from every walk of life and every political persuasion, but on the right bullying holds a special, exalted position. It is no accident that two of the moment’s greatest heroes – Tom DeLay and Oliver North – had the same nickname: ‘the Hammer.’”

The same must have been true as well in ancient Athens – where Plato’s dreamed-of republic and lopsided dialogues did violence to democratic rhetorics – and in Rome, where Cicero’s democratic oratory fell victim to the very real violence of the Caesars’ rising power.

Cicero’s take on the Athenian history just eluded to is particularly hard on Socrates, the presumed source of Plato’s undoubtedly embellished dialogues. Cicero begins, in the sixteenth chapter of the third book of his De Oratore, by contrasting the long tradition of leaders skilled as both men of action and as orators (Themistocles, Pericles, Theramenes), and of others engaged primarily in the teaching of such wisdom (Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Isocrates), with that of others “who being themselves copiously furnished with learning and with talent, but yet shrinking on deliberate principle from politics and affairs, scouted and scorned this practice and oratory. The chief of these,” he wrote, “was Socrates, the person who on the evidence of all men of learning and the verdict of the whole of Greece [...] easily came out top whatever side in a debate he took up” – but who, according to this revisionist treatment, stole from those others the designation of “philosophy” to which “the whole study and practice of the liberal sciences” had formerly been entitled.

“Socrates robbed them of this general designation,” Cicero continued, “and in his discussion separated the science of wise thinking from that of elegant speaking, though in reality they are closely linked together; and the genius and varied discourses of Socrates have been immortally enshrined in the compositions of Plato, Socrates himself not having left a single scrap of writing. This is the source from which has sprung the undoubtedly absurd and unprofitable and reprehensible severance between the tongue and the brain, leading to our having one set of professors to teach us to think and another to teach us to speak.”

Perhaps Cicero is too hard on Socrates, though he hardly denies the eloquence or even the genius of his philosophy. It is likely, after all, that no one really does or ever will know the true and historical Socrates. My brother Kirk R. Sanders, an Assistant Professor of Philosophy and the Classics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, recently told me that he is translating an ancient text by Xenophon, another of Socrates’s students. Xenophon’s Socrates, apparently, has little in common with Plato’s, and (as of yet?) there is no clear way to resolving that contradiction.

Plato, for his part, is likewise not to be dismissed in the areas of philosophical genius and eloquence, but his ideas and their consequences are not therefore to be accepted uncritically. But however beautiful his rhetoric, it remains a rhetoric stained by an essentially anti-democratic and authoritarian socio-political view. Platonic rhetoric, undiluted, exists only to persuade with its beauteous and betimes disingenuous argument of the One and Only Undisputed Truth, which in the world of public affairs can neither be agreed upon nor ascertained. So that as I read the Phaedrus, while a part of me is stirred by the beautifully Quixotic imagery of one “regarded as mad, who, when he sees the beauty on earth, remembering the true beauty, feels his wings growing and longs to stretch them for an upward flight, but cannot do so, and, like a bird, gazes upward and neglects the things below” – while this stirs something in me, as I have said, I, like the old gentleman Alonso Quixana – a.k.a., Don Quixote –, have had to search in other places for hope (which is perhaps “audacious” enough simply grounded in the real possibilities of an Obama Presidency).

For we live here on the humble Darwinian ground, to which the birch-climbing narrator of Robert Frost’s poem only too gladly returns.

____

A President Obama, it might bear repeating, does not in himself constitute such an agenda or promise or program as his candidacy might inspire. Even as he unveils his plans for international and domestic policy, he is not so much the Man with the Plan as the potential center of a movement that will shape and modify what is actually initiated or delivered – or deliverable – during the span of his Presidency. Ideas, as Menand’s American Pragmatists argue (The Metaphysical Club, 2001), are communal or social constructs; and the good rhetor-orator, insists Isocrates, is one of great persuasive gifts but also capable of being persuaded.

I have worried that Senator Obama’s foreign policy has been too slow to cast off the militaristic assumptions of his political opposition, and that his statements on neoliberal trade policies and economic injustice have seemed to waver somewhere between substantive change and appeasement. Through years of my own wrestling with these questions, I have come to believe with fierce passion that what we need is a sustained and drastic demilitarization coupled with significant increases in international aid and diplomacy. To speak, as Obama has, of increasing the military budget and upping the ante in Afghanistan, seems to neglect other facts on the ground, in particular that the overwhelming need for a renewed and expanded social contract at home can hardly be financed without a considerable subtraction of Pentagon monies.

But if Obama is not the Man with the Plan, neither am I. Nor is Katrina vanden Heuvel the Woman with the Plan, though she has proposed a very good one, and in the absence of a better one – and in the spirit of Wayne Booth’s “rhetorics of assent” – I recommend it as a solid working draft for the shared progressive agenda that I hope will take shape in the coming months.

Be all of that as it may, I take some comfort from Obama’s recent elaborations of his plans for Iraq and beyond. Given the mess that he inherits, and the generally conservative undercurrent of the national psyche where national defense and the military are concerned, Obama’s plan for Iraq and Afghanistan does not seem unreasonable – even as it remains inadequate.

-----Brett Alan Sanders



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